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Trade and the Competitiveness Agenda
José Guilherme Reis and Thomas Farole
Export-Led Growth, the Crisis, and the End 
of an Era
The dramatic expansion in global trade over recent decades
has contributed significantly to diversification, growth, and
poverty reduction in many developing countries. This period
of rapid export growth has been enabled by two critical
structural changes in global trade: (1) the vertical and spatial
fragmentation  of  manufacturing  into  highly  integrated
“global production networks,” and (2) the rise of services
trade and the growth of “offshoring.” Both of these, in turn,
were made possible by major technological revolutions; and
they were supported by multilateral trade policy reforms
and broad liberalizations in domestic trade and investment
environments worldwide.
The global economic crisis came crashing into the middle
of this long-running export-led growth party during 2008
and 2009. Between the last quarter of 2007 and the second
quarter of 2009, global trade contracted by 36 percent. But
as the recovery started to strengthen in 2010 (at least until
the clouds began to form over Europe), the longer-term im-
pacts of the crisis on the policy environment regarding trade
and growth were becoming more apparent. Indeed, in addi-
tion to raising concerns over the global commitment to trade
liberalization, the crisis has also led to some serious rethink-
ing  of  some  of  the  conventional  wisdom  regarding  the
growth agenda—the most important result of which is the
likelihood that governments will play a much more activist
role in the coming years. There are three principal reasons
why governments are likely to be more actively involved in
industrial and trade policy in the coming years. 
First, the crisis has undone faith in markets and discred-
ited laissez-faire approaches that rely simply on trade policy
liberalization. Instead, governments and local markets have
been “rediscovered.” In this sense, the demand for activist
government is likely to go well beyond financial markets and
regulation, and it will affect the policy environment in which
trade and industrial strategies are designed.
Second, the crisis has highlighted the critical importance
of diversification (of sectors, products, and trading partners)
in reducing the risks of growth volatility. The recent era of
globalization contributed to substantial specialization of
The global economic crisis has forced a major rethinking of the respective roles of governments and markets in the
processes of trade and growth. Indeed, industrial policy seems to be back in fashion—or, at least, talking about it is.
But a renewed “activism” by government in the trade and growth agenda need not mean a return to old-style
policies of import substitution and “picking winners.” Instead, it may mean a stronger focus on competitiveness by
unlocking the constraints to private sector–led growth. This note discusses the renewed role of government in trade
and growth policy from the competitiveness angle, and it suggests some priorities for the new competitiveness agenda.
Africa: Leveraging the Crisis into a Development Takeoff
Shantayanan Devarajan and Sudhir Shetty
Africa’s precrisis growth and poverty reduction was the result of increased external resources, a buoyant global economy and—crucially—improved 
economic policies. Although it is still the world’s poorest region, the prospects for resuming growth are good. Additional resources and further policy 
reforms could launch the continent on a path of sustained growth and poverty reduction.
Growth and Poverty Reduction before the 
Crises
Until the onset of the food, fuel, and financial crises of 2007–
9, the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa had been experiencing 
relatively rapid economic growth for over a decade. Between 
1997 and 2007, gross domestic product (GDP) grew at almost 
5 percent a year—the same rate as all developing countries ex-
cept China and India—and accelerated to over 6 percent in 
2006–7. Poverty was declining: the percentage of Africans liv-
ing on US$1.25 a day fell from 59 percent to 50 percent. Un-
like previous episodes of rapid growth, this period was not 
driven solely by the boom in oil and commodity prices of the 
early 2000s: about 22 non-oil-exporting countries, accounting 
for one-third of the African population, had an average annual 
growth of more than 4 percent during 1998–2008. The oil 
exporters, home to another third of the population, also en-
joyed rapid growth—over 6.5 percent annually for the decade—
thanks to high oil prices and, as detailed below, sound macro-
economic management. The remaining third of the population 
lived in countries that were growing slowly or not at all. Most of 
these countries were either in conflict or emerging from it, al-
though some countries, such as Zimbabwe, were simply stuck 
in a disastrous policy environment.1 
Africa’s precrisis growth and poverty reduction were due to 
a  combination  of  three,  mutually  reinforcing  factors.  First, 
there was an increase in external resources. Foreign aid, fueled 
by debt relief, increased by about US$14 billion—although the 
increase  falls  about  US$11  billion  short  of  the  Gleneagles 
pledge to double aid to Africa by 2010 (World Bank 2010b). 
Private capital flows to Africa also increased, reaching a peak of 
US$53 billion in 2007 (IMF 2010). And remittances grew at 
double-digit rates, peaking at US$20 billion in 2007 (Ratha, 
Mohapatra, and Silwal 2010). Second, African countries ben-
efited from a buoyant global economy and rising commodity 
prices. But perhaps the most important factor was that the un-
derlying economic policy environment in Africa had improved 
significantly since the mid-1990s. Most countries had under-
taken macroeconomic and fiscal policy reforms, and they were 
beginning to pay off: the median inflation rate in the mid-
2000s was half that in the mid-1990s, and in 1996, there were 
13 African countries with inflation above 20 percent, by 2007, 
there were only 2.  
The Crises of 2007–9
The triple crises of 2007–9 threatened to bring Africa’s resur-
gent growth and poverty reduction to an abrupt halt. The dou-
bling of food prices (in dollar terms) in 2007 hurt poor Afri-
cans, many of whom spend over half of their budget on food. 
Analysts estimated that poverty would increase by about 4 per-
centage points (Ivanic and Martin 2008).  Riots broke out in 
cities such as Ouagadougou, Maputo, and Douala. African gov-
ernments responded by lowering taxes, including import tariffs 
on food and, in some cases, increasing existing subsidies.  Coun-
tries that had reasonably well-functioning safety net programs 
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to participants in its Productive Safety Nets Program.  Unlike in 
previous crises, very few countries resorted to price controls. 
Those that introduced export restrictions, as a means of keep-
ing domestic prices low, soon abandoned them. Nevertheless, 
the food price crisis highlighted two weaknesses in the African 
policy environment. One weakness was that poor agricultural 
infrastructure, not to mention in some cases the abandonment 
of food production, prevented farmers from benefiting fully 
from higher food prices. The other weakness was that very little 
was known about the effectiveness of existing safety nets in Af-
rica, so it was not clear which programs could or should be 
scaled up during a crisis. 
The near-doubling of world oil prices in 2007–8 had an 
asymmetric effect, with oil importers suffering a terms-of-trade 
shock of 5 to 7 percent of GDP, while oil exporters enjoyed a 
windfall of double that magnitude. The oil importers respond-
ed by increasing subsidies or lowering fuel taxes. In contrast to 
their behavior during previous oil booms, most of the oil ex-
porters saved the additional revenues. When the price of oil 
was US$140 a barrel, Angola, Gabon, and Nigeria used a refer-
ence price of about US$80 a barrel.2 
The global financial crisis that started in September 2008 
initially had only a mild effect on African economies. Most Af-
rican banks were not sufficiently integrated with the global fi-
nancial system to suffer from the fallout. The few countries 
with globally integrated financial systems, such as Mauritius 
and South Africa, had strong prudential regulations that pro-
tected them.  
But when the financial crisis turned into an economic crisis, 
most African countries were severely affected. Private capital 
flows, which had been increasing faster in Africa than in any 
other region, dried up. The Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) saw a decline of foreign direct investment of US$1.8 bil-
lion. Kenya and Ghana postponed sovereign bond offerings 
worth US$800 million. Remittances, which had been rising at 
about 13 percent a year, slowed to a trickle. Africa was particu-
larly hard hit because 75 percent of its remittances come from 
the United States and Western Europe, the epicenter of the cri-
sis. The decline in commodity prices reversed the terms-of-
trade shock of the previous year, with oil importers gaining and 
exporters losing. While the savings during the oil boom helped 
cushion some of these exporters, the fact that their economies 
were so heavily dependent on oil meant that GDP growth suf-
fered. Angola’s GDP, for instance, went from growing at over 
15 percent a year during 2004–8 to 1 percent in 2009. Finally, 
foreign aid was unlikely to increase given the fiscal problems in 
donor countries. 
Policy Responses to the Crises
The net result was that Africa’s GDP growth rate fell from 5.8 
percent in 2008 to 1.4 percent in 2009 (World Bank 2010a). 
Although growth was still positive (in contrast to most of the 
developed world), the decline in per capita GDP meant that 
poverty would rise. An estimated additional 7 to 10 million Af-
ricans would be thrown into poverty. Furthermore, such sharp 
declines in growth are associated with increases in infant mor-
tality: some 30,000 to 50,000 additional infants were likely to 
die before their first birthday (Friedman and Schady 2009). 
Perhaps most troubling was the prospect that the economic re-
forms, which had been delivering strong growth and poverty 
reduction until 2008, would be slowed or reversed. The payoffs 
to these reforms had suddenly disappeared. And the policies 
being pursued by developed countries—increasing fiscal deficits 
and nationalizing banks—were precisely in the opposite direc-
tion of what African governments were undertaking. 
These policy reversals did not happen. Those African coun-
tries that had some fiscal space, thanks to debt relief and pru-
dent macroeconomic management before the crisis, ran mod-
est countercyclical policies, dampening the impact of the global 
crisis on the domestic economy. Zambia, for instance, ran a fis-
cal deficit of 2.6 percent of GDP. Most of the increase in the 
fiscal deficit (which averaged about 2 percentage points) was 
the result of the decline in government revenues. Government 
expenditures did not increase because implementation diffi-
culties would have prevented them from stimulating the econ-
omy. The increased deficits were financed by a combination of 
domestic borrowing (which expanded by 2 percentage points 
of GDP) and front-loaded, concessional resources from the 
World Bank and the African Development Bank. 
Furthermore, those countries that did not have fiscal space 
chose to run contractionary fiscal policies to maintain long-
term sustainability. For example, Ghana, which, unrelated to 
external shocks, had a fiscal deficit of 14 percent of GDP in 
2008, has now embarked on a program to reduce that deficit by 
2 percentage points a year for the next six years. 
Not only did African countries respond quickly and prag-
matically to the global crisis, but many of them innovated and 
in some cases accelerated reforms. Tanzania, for instance, intro-
duced an emergency program for the banking sector that pro-
vides loan guarantees that are strictly time bound (two years), a 
feature that is lacking in comparable programs in the United 
States and Europe. Recognizing that public investment typi-
cally suffers in recessionary times, South Africa provided coun-
tercyclical funds of about US$100 billion exclusively for public 
investment (this was also necessary so the country could host 
the 2010 Soccer World Cup). Mauritius introduced an innova-
tive burden-sharing program among business, labor, and gov-
ernment to restructure distressed companies. Finally, Nigeria 
used the weakness in oil prices to begin deregulating its down-
stream petroleum sector. 
Longer-Term Challenges and Opportunities
The growth recovery across a large swath of the continent since 
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policy responses of most countries to the crises of 2007–9 are 
encouraging. Nevertheless, much of the African continent con-
tinues to face a number of challenges in the medium term. In 
what follows, four such challenges are noted, along with the op-
portunities to address them, while recognizing that the specif-
ics will necessarily differ across countries. 
Infrastructure gaps. In almost every African country, the lack 
of physical infrastructure is a constraint to growth and poverty 
reduction. Not only is infrastructure lacking, it is also signifi-
cantly more expensive than elsewhere in the developing world. 
Average  electricity  costs  of  US$0.18  per  kilowatt  hour  are 
about double the costs in other developing countries. Infra-
structure gaps are largest by far in energy, with citizens in 30 of 
the 47 countries in sub-Saharan Africa facing regular power 
shortages and service interruptions. Furthermore, only one in 
four Africans has access to electricity. Collectively, the coun-
tries of the subcontinent (with more than 800 million people) 
have about the same power generation capacity as that of Spain, 
which has about one-twentieth of the population (Foster and 
Briceno-Garmendia 2010). 
Filling these gaps and lowering service costs will require 
both more money and reforms in the provision of infrastruc-
ture. The additional money will need to come from domestic 
and external sources, including donors. And there will need to 
be a balance between spending on new investment and on op-
erations and maintenance, so that the latter is not crowded out. 
To get the level of infrastructure of all African countries to the 
level of Mauritius, an additional US$48 billion per year will be 
needed, a third of which will be needed to cover maintenance. 
The complementary policy and institutional reforms in infra-
structure sectors will both ensure that new investment is well 
spent and help bring the private sector into financing and oper-
ating these facilities. Nevertheless, even if potential efficiency 
gains are fully realized, a funding gap of about US$31 billion 
will remain (Foster and Briceno-Garmendia 2010).
A specific infrastructure investment that will be important 
in almost every African country is irrigation expansion. De-
spite its importance to economic activity and its potential role 
in reducing poverty, agriculture in most African countries has 
been ignored until relatively recently; the adverse impacts of 
this neglect were highlighted during the food crisis of 2008. 
And with less than 5 percent of cultivated land irrigated, Afri-
can agriculture remains extremely vulnerable to the effects of 
global climate change—more frequent floods and droughts and 
what appears to be a long-term drying trend in many parts of 
the continent. 
The demographic transition and job creation. In many coun-
tries in sub-Saharan Africa, the demographic transition has not 
even begun. There are still many Sahelian countries, such as 
Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, where the population growth 
rate is over 3 percent per year, with total fertility rates of more 
than 7 children per woman. Even where the transition has 
started, there is a bulge in the under-15 population that will 
work its way into the labor force in the coming decades. These 
factors will exacerbate the problem of youth unemployment, 
with 7 million to 10 million young people entering the labor 
force every year and formal sector job growth not fast enough to 
absorb them. The creation of productive employment opportu-
nities, especially for the youth, will be an important economic 
and political challenge for African governments (World Bank 
2009a).  
Part of the solution will be to reduce the demographic pres-
sures, especially where fertility rates are still high. These efforts 
will need to go beyond providing access and information to 
family planning services and include the empowerment of girls 
and women, particularly through access to education. There 
will also need to be efforts to increase the demand for youth la-
bor, including in the informal sector where most jobs in low-
income African economies are created. The informal sector is 
estimated to employ about 80 percent of Africa’s labor force. 
Improving the investment climate is critical in this regard both 
for formal and informal sector firms. And targeted efforts to 
expand youth employment, such as wage subsidies or vocation-
al training schemes, will need to take into account and build on 
global experience with such interventions. 
Governance and state capacity. The challenges of governance 
and limited state capacity are starkest in the 20 fragile states of 
Africa—whether as a result of earlier conflicts, such as for Cóte 
d’Ivoire and the Central African Republic, or because they are 
still in conflict, such as Somalia. But as with the issue of job 
creation, governance challenges cut across all of Africa. Even 
resource-rich countries show significant weaknesses in gover-
nance, which means they gain much less than they should from 
their natural resource wealth. In general, although there are ex-
ceptions such as Mauritius, the quality of public sector manage-
ment and institutions is lower in sub-Saharan Africa than in 
other regions. The most significant adverse outcome of these 
governance weaknesses is the poor quality of service delivery in 
health,  education,  and  water  and  sanitation.  Public  school 
teachers in Uganda are absent about 20 percent of the time 
(Habayiramana 2010). In Chad, the share of nonwage public 
health resources that reaches the primary clinics is 1 percent 
(Gauthier and Wane 2009). These service delivery failures have 
hindered faster progress toward the Millennium Development 
Goals. 
Improving governance will necessarily be a long-term and 
country-specific effort. However, where conflict is still preva-
lent, such as in DRC, or the risks of conflict resumption are 
high, such as in Sudan, the root causes will still need to be ad-
dressed,  including  through  long-term  coordinated  support 
from development partners. In resource-rich economies, prior-
ity needs to be placed on ways of increasing transparency, pro-
moting  accountability,  and  improving  decision  making 
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cover such areas as the awards of licenses and contracts, the 
macroeconomic management of windfall revenues, and public 
spending  decisions.  All  countries  must  focus  on  improving 
their capabilities and incentivizing the public sector to better 
plan and implement development policies that are tailored to 
their country circumstances.
Aid volumes and modalities. Much of Africa will remain aid 
dependent in the medium term. However, as the developed  
countries assess the full impact of the financial crisis, aid flows 
from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors 
are not likely to grow as robustly as they have over the past de-
cade. Even before the crisis, projections were that overseas de-
velopment assistance would be about US$11 billion short of 
the Gleneagles commitment to double aid to Africa by 2010. 
With the impact of the crisis, the gap has only widened. Along-
side tightening aid budgets, there is also a backlash emerging 
against budget support as the preferred modality of aid provi-
sion  in  many  Western  European  countries—despite  the  evi-
dence that this instrument lowers transaction costs, supports 
capacity building, and helps harmonize donor support. Ironi-
cally, these developments are happening when the productivity 
of aid to Africa—as a result of the policy reforms undertaken 
over the last 15 years and the continued pursuit of prudent 
policies during the crisis—has never been higher. 
Conclusion
Africa is the world’s poorest region and faces development chal-
lenges  of  monumental  proportions.  Nevertheless,  the  conti-
nent’s prospects for resuming growth are good because policy 
reforms generated relative rapid economic growth and poverty 
reduction before the global crisis, and because policy makers by 
and large continued to pursue these policies during the crisis. It 
also means that there is increasing political support for pro-poor 
reforms—the very reforms that will help the continent address 
the challenges of infrastructure improvement, job creation, gov-
ernance,  and  shrinking  aid.  If  the  international  community 
continues to support Africa, the combination of additional re-
sources and policy reforms could launch the continent on a 
path of sustained, rapid growth and poverty reduction. 
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